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Recent Decisions
SOVEREIGN IM uNITY-GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE-
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF SPECIFICATIONS-IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL
INDEMNIFICATION-The United States Supreme Court held that
the federal government cannot be liable in contract for breach of
implied-in-law warranties by government contractors who incur
expenses in defending third party tort claims arising from the
contractors' compulsory production of war materials in accord-
ance with government-furnished specifications.
Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996).
Hercules, Incorporated ("Hercules") and Win. T. Thompson
Company ("Thompson") (collectively, "contractors") were among
seven producers' of a chemical defoliant,2 code-named "Agent
Orange,"3 manufactured under fixed price mandatory contracts
issued by the United States military from 1964 to 1968 pursuant
1. Hercules, Inc. v. United States ("Hercules II"), 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996). The
other producers of Agent Orange were: Diamond-Shamrock Alkali, Dow Chemical, Mon-
santo Chemical, T.H. Agriculture and Nutrition and Uniroyal Merchandising. PETER H.
ScHuci, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 156 (1986).
2. A defoliant is a chemical that causes plant leaves to drop off prematurely when
applied by either spraying or dusting. MERIuAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 303
(10th ed. 1994).
3. Agent Orange is comprised of an equal mixture of two herbicides: 2,4-
Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid ("2,4-D") and Trichlorophenoxyacetic Acid ("2,4,5-T").
ScHucic, supra note 1, at 16. Production of 2,4,5-T caused the creation of varying
amounts of the contaminant 2,3,7,8 Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin ("TCDD" or "dioxin") as
a byproduct of the manufacturing process; this contaminant remained in the final prod-
uct. Win. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct.17, 20 (1992), affd sub. nom. Her-
cules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F. 3d 188 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aft'd, 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996).
TCDD has been described as "perhaps the most toxic molecule ever synthesized by man."
ScHucK, supra note 1, at 18, quoting RIcHARD EPSTEiN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILrTY LAw
(1980).
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to the Defense Production Act of 1950 ("DPA").4 In support of
these contracts, the government supplied detailed specifications5
to the contractors regarding the chemical formula and packaging
of Agent Orange.'
Specially equipped, low-flying American military cargo aircraft
sprayed Agent Orange in high concentrations7 over the jungles
and cultivated areas of South Vietnam from early 1965 through
April of 1970 in an operation code-named "Ranch Hand."' The
purpose of this aerial operation was to frustrate the Viet Cong's
4. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 984. The Defense Production Act of 1950 provides, in
part:
(a) Allocation of materials and facilities. The President [or his authorized repre-
sentative] is hereby authorized
(1) to require that performance under contracts or orders (other than contracts of
employment) which he deems necessary or appropriate to promote the national
defense shall take priority over performance under any other contract or order,
and, for the purpose of assuring such priority, to require acceptance and perform-
ance of such contracts or orders in preference to other contracts or orders by any
person he finds to be capable of their performance, and
(2) to allocate materials, services, and facilities in such manner, upon such condi-
tions, and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the
national defense.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a) (1988).
5. Government research into the military applications of herbicides began during
World War II at Fort Detrick, Maryland. ScHucx, supra note 1, at 16. The defoliants
developed by the government during this program proved more potent, cheaper and were
thought to be safer than existing commercial herbicides. Id.
6. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 983. Agent Orange was one of a series of specific
herbicides produced during the same period by commercial herbicide manufacturers
exclusively for military use. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 17. The other military herbicides
were code-named Agents Pink, Blue, Green, Purple and White. Id. at 16. Agent Orange
eventually displaced the other Agents in the series, accounting for sixty percent of the
defoliant used in Vietnam. Id. at 17. The Agents' designations derived from the three
inch wide colored stripes the contractors were required by specification to place on the
metal drums containing the defoliants. Id. The legend "[n]o further identification as to
content" was the only other marking permitted under the specifications to appear on the
metal drums. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 984. The government's specifications did not
include a requirement for instructions for use to be placed on the drums, nor were
instructions provided by the government to field troops, with the result that empty defoli-
ant drums were frequently converted by soldiers into barbecues and field showers. Id. at
990.
7. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 17. During the five year period of its use, the United
States military sprayed an estimated 11.2 million gallons of undiluted Agent Orange over
approximately 6,635 square miles (or ten percent of the land area of South Vietnam) at an
average rate of three gallons per acre per application. Id. at 17; RAND McNALLY - READ
ERS WoRLD ATLAS xiv (1958). The solution strength and rate of application of Agent
Orange by the American military sharply contrasted with standard commercial practice,
which called for dilution of agricultural herbicide with water, to a concentration of one
percent of total volume, sprayed at a rate of one gallon per acre. Thompson, 26 Cl. Ct. at
20.
8. Schuck, supra note 1, at 16. Aerial spraying of defoliants was initially
approved by President Kennedy on the joint recommendation of the Defense and State
Departments following successful field experiments in Vietnam in 1960. Id.
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successful use of the land as a military resource. 9 Delivery of the
defoliant by aerial spraying was necessarily imprecise, resulting
in exposing not only the Viet Cong to Agent Orange, but also
American and Allied soldiers (collectively "veterans").10
Many of these veterans and their families filed suit against the
contractors in the late 1970's, claiming that they had been
harmed by exposure to the dioxin contained in Agent Orange. 1
These separate actions were consolidated and certified as a class
action by the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
9. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 983. The dense jungle foliage screened Viet Cong
camps and troop movements from Allied ground and aerial detection; civilian farms and
the jungle provided the Viet Cong with food, heightening guerilla unit mobility and les-
sening the need for frequent resupply. Id. at 983; ScHuCK, supra note 1, at 16.
10. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 984. Approximately 2.5 million Americans, Aus-
tralians, Canadians and New Zealanders were potentially affected by Agent Orange,
either through direct exposure in Vietnam during the period 1965-70, or through alleged
genetic damage from an exposed parent. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp.
1368, 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762,
787-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), reu'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980); cert. denied sub. nom. Dia-
mond Shamrock v. Ryan, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984) ; SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 22.
11. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 984. While a definite causal link in humans has yet
to be established scientifically between exposure to Agent Orange and the incidence of
cancers, miscarriages, birth defects and other health problems, the veterans alleged that
the dioxin present in Agent Orange was responsible for these occurrences. Id.; Thomp-
son, 26 Cl. Ct. at 20 n.2. Studies performed in 1965-66 by Bionetics Research Laborato-
ries under contract to the National Cancer Institute indicated, however, that 2,4,5-T (one
of the components of Agent Orange) caused teratogenic effects (fetal abnormalities) in
mice and rats at exposure rates of thirty parts of dioxin per million. ScHtucK, supra note
1, at 19-20.
The same study, which was not published until 1969, indicated that 2,4-D (the
other component of Agent Orange) was also a potential source of similar birth defects. Id.
at 20. When the Pentagon was apprised of these findings, military officials initially main-
tained that exposure levels to Agent Orange were much lower in the field than those in
the animal studies. Id. In 1970, however, military use of Agent Orange was temporarily,
and later permanently, halted. Id.
In 1979, a study conducted by Arthur Galston, a Yale biologist specializing in
herbicide research, found that daily ingestion by rats of TCCD-contaminated food with a
concentration of fifty parts per billion caused rapid death from acute toxicity, one part per
billion caused premature death from toxic aggregation and five parts per trillion (approxi-
mately one drop per four million gallons of water) induced cancers. Id. at 18. Galston's
report also provided that lower concentrations of TCCD eventually produced the same
effect as higher concentrations, merely taking longer to do so. Id. Military estimates on
the amount of TCCD that the veterans were exposed to are considered unreliable, as it is
impossible to determine how much Agent Orange actually reached ground level where it
could be ingested or inhaled. Id. Testing of the remaining stockpiles of Agent Orange
after the war, however, revealed an average TCCD concentration of two parts per million,
with some discrete samples testing up to one hundred and forty parts per million. Id.
On May 23, 1996, less than three months after the decision in Hercules III, a
Rhode Island jury found that Agent Orange, used from 1968-72 to clear tree branches
from electric high tension wires, was the proximate (legal) cause of the development of
bone marrow cancer in a utility company lineman. Jody McPhillips, Warwick Man Wins
Agent Orange Suit, PROV.DENCE [R.I.] JouRNAL-BuLLeTIN, May 24, 1966, at BO. The
jury awarded the lineman 1.2 million dollars in damages, a judgment which the defend-
ant, Dow Chemical, is expected to appeal. Id.
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trict of New York. 12 The contractors filed motions for summary
judgment,13 arguing that they were immune from suit due to
their status as "government contractors."'4 The district judge
agreed, granting the contractors' motions.'5 Before entry of that
judgment, the case was transferred to a successor judge who
ruled that the government contractor defense was an issue to be
determined at trial, thereby reinstating the contractors as
defendants.'
6
Just hours before trial, the court engineered a settlement
between the contractors and the veterans. 17 The settlement
agreement specified that the contractors would create a settle-
ment fund of $180 million; each contractor's contribution deter-
mined by combining two factors: market share and dioxin
content of the Agent Orange produced.' In later proceedings,
the court granted the manufacturers' motion for summary judg-
12. "Agent Orange," 506 F. Supp. at 787-92.
13. A party filing a motion for summary judgment alleges that there is no genuine
issue of material fact for a court to adjudicate (reasonable men could not differ with the
moving party's interpretation of the fact), and that, therefore, the moving party is entitled
to prevail as a matter of law, without a trial. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, 435-38 (2d ed. 1993).
14. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1273-74 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). The "government contractor defense" grants immunity to a government contractor
from tort actions resulting from the contractor's manufacture of products for the govern-
ment in accordance with government provided specifications, if the contractor warned the
government about hazards in the product that became known to the contractor, of which
the government was unaware. Hercules I1, 116 S. Ct. at 985.
The court found that Thompson had extremely limited knowledge as to the
alleged hazards of Agent Orange (as it maintained no testing facility) and that the dioxin
content of the Agent Orange produced by Thompson contained very low levels of dioxin,
ranging from .1 - .3 parts per million. "Agent Orange," 565 F. Supp. at 1273. In addition,
the court found that the Agent Orange Hercules sold to the government after 1965 con-
tained no measurable levels of dioxin. Id. at 1274. In both instances, the court found that
the government possessed superior knowledge (as compared with the contractors) of the
risks associated with dioxin. Id. at 1273-74.
15. "Agent Orange," 565 F. Supp. at 1273, 1274.
16. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). See also ScHUCK,
supra note 1, at 113.
17. "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. at 748.
18. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 984; SCHUCK, supra note 1, at 156. The district court
made the following calculations:
Market Share % of Damages Assessed
Diamond Shamrock 5.1% 12.0%
Dow Chemical 28.6% 19.5%
Hercules Inc. 19.7% 10.0%
Monsanto Chemical 29.5% 45.5%
T.H. Agriculture & Nutrition 7.2% 6.0%
Win. T. Thompson 2.2% 2.0%
Uniroyal 6.5% 5.0%
Id. Hercules was required to contribute $18,772,568 to the settlement fund; Thompson's
contribution was $3,096,597. Their combined defense fees exceeded nine million dollars.
Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 984.
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ment against the two hundred and eighty-seven veterans and
their families who "opted-out" of the class action,19 based on
three alternative grounds: (1) the manufacturers' assertion of
the "government contractor" defense; (2) the veterans' inability to
establish Agent Orange's causative role in their alleged individ-
ual injuries; and (3) the veterans' inability to establish which
manufacturer produced the Agent Orange that caused the
alleged harm.2" On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit found the government contractor defense a
complete bar to liability and affirmed the district court's ruling.21
Attempting to obtain reimbursement from the government for
the litigation and settlement costs incurred in the class action
suit, the contractors filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York. 2 The contractors claimed
damages under tort theories of contribution and noncontractual
indemnification. The court dismissed their claims, reasoning
that because the veterans failed to prove a causative link
between exposure to Agent Orange and their injuries, the gov-
ernment cannot be liable for costs the contractors incurred in
defending and settling the veterans' rejected claims.23 On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this ruling.
24
19. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Lab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
20. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 984 n.1; In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611
F. Supp. 1223, 1263-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1234 (1988). None of the injuries suffered by the veterans were exclusively
attributable to exposure to the dioxin in Agent Orange; all had other potential origins.
ScHUcK, supra note 1, at 18; "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1260-63; "Agent Orange",
597 F. Supp. at 783. Since the drums containing Agent Orange did not bear the name of
the manufacturer, the district court concluded that the drums and their contents were
completely fungible, and thus, identification of the source of the alleged harm was inde-
terminable. "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. at 818-19.
21. "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 189. The Second Circuit thus failed to reach the
issue of causation in the "opt-out" cases. Id. at 194.
22. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1987).
23. "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1222. In response to the veterans' claims in
the class action suit, the government asserted the defense of sovereign immunity under
the "injury suffered incident to military service" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA"). In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 239, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
See infra note 87 for the relevant text of the FTCA. The district court concluded that
since the government was immune to the claims of the veterans, it was similarly immune
to the claims of the contractors. "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1222. In dictum, the
court called the government's assertion of sovereign immunity under the FTCA and
refusal to indemnify the contractors "shortsighted," predicting that future government
contractors might demand indemnification or raise their prices significantly to cover the
contingent cost of litigation of third party claims. Id.
24. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 204, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1987).
The court stated that recovery was barred under the doctrine propounded in Stencel
Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (holding that the same rationale gener-
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Hercules and Thompson then filed suit individually in the
United States Court of Federal Claims, asserting jurisdiction
under the Tucker Act.25 The contractors requested damages in
the form of contractual indemnification for litigation and settle-
ment expenses incurred in the class action suit under various
theories of breach of implied-in-fact contract.26  The court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment against
both contractors. 27 Employing nearly identical language in the
Hercules I and Thompson opinions, the court explained that even
if the contractors could establish a factual basis for any of their
implied-in-fact theories, they were barred from recovery by the
provisions of the Anti-Deficiency Act.2
Hercules' and Thompson's appeals were consolidated in an
action before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit which, in a 2 - 1 decision, affirmed the rulings of the
Court of Claims.29 The majority found that assertion of the gov-
ally prohibiting recovery from the government in tort by a service member also applies to
recovery in tort by a contractor since the relationships are analogous). In addition, the
court held that an action in tort cannot be sustained where the settlement made by the
contractors is essentially "voluntary," since the veterans could prove neither that a partic-
ular injury was caused by Agent Orange nor which company had produced the Agent
Orange alleged to have caused the harm. "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 207.
25. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 984. The Tucker Act provides, in part:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any act of Con-
gress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or nonliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (1994)(emphasis added).
26. Hercules, Inc. v. United States ("Hercules 1"), 25 Cl. Ct. 616, 621 (1992), affd,
24 F.3d 188 (Fed. Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996). Hercules asserted four theories:
(1) superior knowledge of the government (of the intended use and method of application
of Agent Orange and its associated possible health risks); (2) breach of an implied cove-
nant of good faith (the government's exposure of Hercules to increased costs associated
with the possible health risks resulting from Agent Orange's unorthodox use); (3) breach
of an implied "reverse warranty" (the government's obligation to use Agent Orange in a
safe manner); and (4) breach of an implied warranty of specifications (specifying criteria
sufficient to make Agent Orange suitable for its intended and actual use). Id. Thompson
asserted three theories: (1) superior knowledge of the Government; (2) breach of an
implied warranty of specifications; and (3) breach of an implied duty to indemnify a con-
tractor for losses suffered due to its production of Agent Orange under the compulsory
provisions and sanctions of the DPA. Thompson, 26 C1. Ct. at 23.
27. Hercules I, 25 Cl. Ct. at 618; Thompson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 19.
28. Hercules 1, 25 Cl. Ct. at 633-34; Thompson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 29. The Anti-Defi-
ciency Act provides, in part:
(a)(1) An officer or employee of the United States Government... may not -
(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available
in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure of an obligation;
(B) involve [the] government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money
before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law.
31 U.S.C. § 1341 (a1) (1994).
29. Hercules, Inc. v. United States ("Hercules IF), 24 F.3d 188, 190 (Fed. Cir.
1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996).
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ernment contractor defense would have prevented liability from
attaching to the contractors in the class action suit; and there-
fore, their participation in the settlement was a voluntary act.
30
Accusing the Hercules II majority of "unwarranted historical
revisionism,"3 ' Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals pointed out that the viability of the government contrac-
tor defense was still unsettled in 1984.32 Therefore, at the time
of the class action suit, the contractors were justifiably concerned
that liability might be found, as evidenced by the strong and
repeated recommendations of settlement by both the trial judge
and the contractors' attorneys.3 The contractors then appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.34
On appeal, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of
six justices, affirmed the Federal Circuit's grant of summary
judgment to the Government in Hercules 11.3' The Supreme
Court noted that in order for the federal government, as the sov-
ereign authority, to be sued, it must consent to the suit under the
terms of the Constitution or some relevant act of Congress.
36
Jurisdiction was deemed appropriate under the Tucker Act to
hear appeals regarding contractual claims brought against the
United States. 37 The Court, however, found the scope of the
Tucker Act limited to express or implied-in-fact terms, obliga-
tions and contracts, but inapplicable to contracts implied-in-
law.-" In order to obtain an award of damages from the govern-
ment for breach of contract under the Tucker Act, the contractors
30. Hercules 11, 24 F.3d at 202.
31. Id. at 207 (Plager, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 206. The United States Supreme Court first considered the issue of the
government contractor defense in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)
(holding that government contractors are immune from third party tort suits). As Boyle
postdated the settlement of the class action suit by four years, Judge Plager found it
unreasonable to apply Boyle to the Agent Orange contractors. Id.
33. Id. at 205-06 (Plager, J., dissenting). Judge Plager declared, "[i]t ill behooves
the Government, or this court, years later to question whether the trial judge properly
understood the law of the case before him." Id.
34. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1425 (1995). "Certiorari" is a written
order issued by a higher appellate court to a trial or appellate court directing that court to
provide a "certified" record of the proceeding for review. BLAciKs LAw DIcnoNARY 228,
1609 (6th ed. 1991).
35. Hercules, Inc. v. United States ("Hercules IIf"), 116 S. Ct. 981, 985 (1996). Jus-
tice Stevens did not participate in either the consideration or decision in the case. Id. at
983.
36. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 985.
37. Id. Congress enacted the Tucker Act in 1887. The Act is currently codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a)(1), 1491 (1994).
38. Hercules II, 116 S. Ct. at 985. The Court explained that an implied-in-fact
contract or term need not be express, but it must be reasonably inferable from the con-
duct of the parties that a "meeting of the minds" existed at the moment of contract forma-
tion. Id. at 986. This type of implied contract is distinguishable from an implied-in-law
1997 1051
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were required to prove: (1) the existence of an implied agree-
ment reasonably inferable from the conduct of the parties at the
time of contract formation; (2) the government impliedly agreed
to indemnify the contractors' losses stemming from potential
third-party tort claims; and (3) the government impliedly war-
ranted the specifications for Agent Orange.39
Rejecting the contractors' assertion that the government was
responsible for the costs of settling and defending against the
tort claims of the veterans, the Court stated that by providing
specifications, the government warranted only that the contrac-
tor would be able to adequately perform the contract. 4° The jus-
tices refused to enlarge the government's warranty of
specifications to encompass the third-party claims,41 concluding
that the contractors were seeking the same reimbursement rem-
edy under contract theory previously disallowed under tort the-
ory.42 In addition, the claim of breach of a reverse warranty by
the customer, rather than the supplier or seller, was held to be
without merit.
43
Thompson's claim for relief on the grounds of involuntary com-
pulsory production under DPA contracts was also rejected, 44 as
the events leading up to the contract "only served to illuminate
the terms" the parties had agreed to in fact.46 Further, the Court
reasoned that government contracting officers were prohibited
contract or term, which is a legal fiction judicially created to infer a promise where none,
in fact, exists. Id.
39. Id. at 986.
40. Id. (citing United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918), in which the Court
held that when the government furnishes defective specifications to a contractor that
make performance impossible, the government incurs liability for damages- to the
contractor).
41. Id.
42. Id. The district court dismissed the contractors' noncontractual indemnifica-
tion claims against the government arising out of the class action settlement, relying on
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (holding that the govern-
ment is not liable for indemnification and contribution to a subcontractor for damages
paid by the subcontractor to an injured military member when the military member can-
not recover directly from the government). "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1222.
43. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 989. Hercules III characterized the contractors'
claim of breach as a "reverse warranty," an implied promise by the government to use
Agent Orange safely, preventing unreasonable risk to the contractors as well as the users.
Id. A reverse warranty, the Court found, is a legal impossibility since it imposes a duty
on the customer rather than the supplier. Id.
44. Id. at 987. The DPA provides, in part:
§ 2073. Penalties
Any person who willfully performs any act prohibited, or willfully fails to perform
any act required by the provisions of this title [50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2071-76 (1994)] or
any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall upon conviction, be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2073 (1994).
45. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 987.
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from entering into indefinite term contracts.' The Court took
note of specific statutes that permitted indemnification of con-
tractors in extraordinary circumstances in contravention of the
Anti-Deficiency Act, concluding that if the government felt such
an indemnification provision was necessary in the Agent Orange
contracts, the means were available to include one.47 The major-
ity rejected Thompson's argument that Section 2157 of the DPA
acts as a hold-harmless provision, indemnifying contractors for
liabilities accruing from performance of contracts issued pursu-
ant to the Act.'
The Court viewed the contractors' final equitable appeal to
"simple fairness" as an admission of the deficiency of the contrac-
tors' other legal arguments. 49 Finding "fairness" to be a relative
term, the majority found the impact of the contractors' argument
was considerably weakened in this instance by the fact that the
veterans were precluded from recovery of their alleged damages
from the government under the Feres doctrine.50 Further, the
Tucker Act prohibited the Court from ruling on exclusively equi-
46. Id. See supra note 28 for relevant text of the Anti-Deficiency Act. The Comp-
troller General characterizes "open-ended postperformance indemnification" as an indefi-
nite term contract, forbidden by the Anti-Deficiency Act. In re Assumption of Contractor
Liability to Third Persons - Reconsideration, 62 Comp. Gen. 361, 364-65 (1983).
47. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 988. The Court cited as an example of such means 50
U.S.C. § 1431 (1988 & Supp. V. 1996) authorizing the President to suspend other provi-
sions of Title 50 (government procurement) when he deems it necessary in the interest of
national defense. This presidential authority is delegated to the Department of Defense
with the provisos that: (1) amounts expended are within the amounts appropriated by
Congress; (2) authorized under the contract; and (3) adequate documentation is main-
tained. Hercules II, 116 S. Ct. at 988 (citing Exec. Order No. 10789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897
(Nov. 15, 1958), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. at §§ 489-92 (1991)). An amend-
ment to the Executive Order sets forth the situations under which indemnification of
defense contractors may be afforded. Exec. Order No. 11610, 36 Fed. Reg. 13755 (July 22,
1971), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. at §§ 489-92 (1991).
48. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 988. The Defense Production Act of 1950 provides, in
part:
No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any act or failure to act
resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with a rule, regulation or order
issued pursuant to this Act [50 U.S.C. § 2061-70 (1994)] notwithstanding that any
such rule, regulation or order shall thereafter be declared by judicial or other com-
petent authority to be invalid.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2157 (1994). The Court interpreted this provision as providing immunity
to government contractors, not indemnity. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 989. The govern-
ment argued that Section 2157 merely grants immunity from liability to the contractor's
commercial customers whose orders have been displaced due to the priority performance
accorded to the government DPA contract. Id. at 989 n.14.
49. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 989.
50. Id. (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), where the Supreme
Court held that the government, in the interest of preserving military order, is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act to military members on active duty injured as a result
of the negligent acts or omissions of other military members).
Duquesne Law Review
table matters due to the limited scope of jurisdiction provided by
the Act, regardless of the merits of the fairness claim.5'
In a spirited dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer suggested that
although the contractors acknowledged that there were no
explicit warranties in the DPA contracts, warranties were
implicit in the bargained-for-exchange represented by the con-
tracts.52 The contractors offered examples of common industry
practice and trade usage, course of dealings between the parties
and existing statutes and rules of law53 that the dissent found
supported the contractors' allegation that the government knew
Agent Orange produced in conformance with government fur-
nished specifications would prove unsafe.54 In addition, Justice
Breyer found reasonable the contractors' assertion that the gov-
ernment's superior knowledge caused an inequity in bargaining
power between the parties.5 5 The dissent noted that the Federal
Circuit in Hercules II assumed the existence of implied warran-
ties in the Agent Orange contracts,56 but rejected the circuit
court's conclusion that by failing to pursue the government con-
tractor defense at trial and engaging in a pretrial settlement, the
contractors severed the causal connection between the breach of
the implied promises by the government and the subsequent
harm to the contractors. 57 Justice Breyer criticized the Court for
ignoring the Hercules II holding of "no causation" between the
promise, the breach and the harm5 Instead, the Court held that
the contractors would not be able to prove the existence of the
implied promises - a holding, in the dissent's view, unsupported
by the record of the Federal Circuit proceeding, and therefore,
impermissible.
5 9
The dissent found that the Federal Circuit's reliance on hind-
sight flawed its holding of lack of causation, explaining that the
law had changed substantially in the twelve years since the set-
51. Id.
52. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined in dissent. Id.
53. Id.
54. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 989. The government specifications were silent on
providing instructions for safe use of Agent Orange, either through labeling the drums or
providing technical orders for its safe use to field units. Id. at 990.
55. Id. at 990. The contractors argued that this inequity of knowledge created an
assumption of risk by the government due to the defective specifications, creating a gov-
ernment duty of indemnification owed to the contractors. Id. As the contractors had lit-
tle or no knowledge of the risks that might attach to the production of Agent Orange, they
were unable to include appropriate monetary contingencies in the price charged under
the DPA contracts. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 990 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 990-91.
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tlement of the class action suit - the viability of the government
contractor defense had not been decided by the Supreme Court.
60
In the legal climate of 1984, the settlement might have been rea-
sonable because the circuits that had addressed the issue of the
government contractor defense had arrived at very different con-
clusions and the issue had not yet come before the Second Circuit
where the Agent Orange litigation took place.6 1 Further support-
ing a finding that the settlement was reasonable was the fact
that even the two district court judges assigned to the class
action suit had issued contradictory rulings on the subject.
62 If
the settlement was reasonable in light of the circumstances in
1984, it was not unforeseeable litigation and within the purview
of the contracts' implied warranties. 3 Moreover, the contractors
mitigated their damages by settling, avoiding further litigation
costs and potentially incredible financial liability. 
6
The Hercules III majority assumed that a government con-
tracting officer would not enter into a contract that might create
even an implicit promise of postperformance indemnification.
65
The dissent, however, found this reasoning spurious and unsup-
ported by fact.6 Justice Breyer pointed to various regulations
and documents in effect in 1964 bolstering the contractors' posi-
tion that implied indemnification was permissible at the time the
60. Id. at 991. Justice Breyer strongly disagreed with the Federal Circuit's por-
trayal of the contractors' settlement of the class action suit as unreasonable, unforesee-
able litigation behavior, stating that the record did not support that contention. Id. at
990-91.
61. Id. Since the Supreme Court decided the validity of the government contractor
defense in Boyle v. United States, 487 U.S. 500 (1988) on different grounds than those
found persuasive by the circuit courts, Justice Breyer reasoned it was more logical for the
Court to conclude that the issue was unresolved at the time of the class action settlement.
Id.
62. Id. Judge Pratt granted the contractors' motion for summary judgment based
on his acceptance of the government contractor defense. "Agent Orange," 565 F. Supp. at
1272-73. This ruling was never entered due to his elevation to the Second Circuit.
ScHucK, supra note 1, at 110. Judge Pratt's successor in the case, Chief Judge Weinstein,
reversed Judge Pratt's order and reinstated the contractors as defendants in the class
action proceedings. "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. at 753. Later, in the "opt-out" cases,
Judge Weinstein reversed his previous stance on the issue and granted the contractors'
motion for summary judgment based on acceptance of the government contractor defense.
"Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1263-64.
63. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 991.
64. Id. The number of eligible class members was never exactly determined (the
veterans estimated the number as 2.4 million persons). ScuucKc, supra note 1, at 162.
The veterans' complaint alleged damages between four and forty billion dollars, more
than the combined liquid assets of all seven manufacturers. "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at
989 n.5.
65. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 992.
66. Id.
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contracts were entered into. 7 Further, Justice Breyer disagreed
with the majority's holding that Comptroller General opinions
generally supported the proposition that an implied promise of
indemnification would contravene the Anti-Deficiency Act,'
explaining that Comptroller General decisions in effect in 1964
implied the opposite conclusion - that indemnification agree-
ments capped at an amount that could be covered by private
insurance were proper.6 9 Envisioning the government in the role
of self-insurer, Justice Breyer suggested such a contingency fac-
tor could be built into the contract price as the cap would assure
that the amount was within the appropriation.7 °
The dissent, disagreeing with the Court's interpretation of the
holding in United States v. Spearin71 that the implied warranty
of specifications only assured possibility of performance, sug-
gested alternatively that the implied warranty of specifications
in Spearin acted to hold the contractor harmless when the prod-
uct produced in accordance with the specifications was defec-
tive.72 Justice Breyer also found the Court placed the wrong
emphasis on the contractors' reliance on the hold-harmless provi-
sion of the DPA.
73
67. Id. The language of the 1964 edition of the Anti-Deficiency Act was ambiguous
regarding indemnification. Id. Executive Order No. 10789 (Nov. 15, 1958), as amended,
did not mention indemnification until the 1971 amendment (Exec. Order No. 11610 (July
22, 1971)), when it established special procedures for indemnification and cited circum-
stances under which indemnification is appropriate and permissible. Id. The Code of
Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.") at 32 C.F.R. § 17.204-4 and 32 C.F.R. § 17.206(1) provides
that indemnification contracts are limited to the amount authorized by the contract and
the amount of the Congressional appropriation. Id. 32 C.F.R. § 17.204-4 provides:
Informal commitments may be formalized under certain circumstances to permit
payment to persons who have taken action without formal contract [e.g., where a
person has furnished property or services to the military in good faith reliance on
the apparent authority of the person giving an oral instruction]. Formalization of
commitments under such circumstances normally will facilitate the national
defense by assuring such persons that they will be treated fairly and paid
expeditiously.
32 C.F.R. § 17.204-4 (1960).
68. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 992 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 993.
71. 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
72. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. Id. Justice Breyer found that the contractors were not claiming that Section
2157 of the DPA offered explicit indemnity, but that the provision could reasonably lead a
contracting officer of the period to believe that an implied agreement to indemnify was
reasonable in providing contractors with relief from unanticipated liability. See supra
note 47 for the relevant text of the DPA. Further, a government contracting officer might
have reasonably assumed the government was accepting a duty of indemnification under
the compulsory production provisions of the Act. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 993 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
Hercules, Inc. v. United States
In addition, the dissent believed that the Court's reliance on
the rule announced in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States
74
was misplaced when used for the purpose of finding only immu-
nity for government contractors, rather than the implied promise
of indemnity urged by the contractors.75 Justice Breyer based his
conclusion on the fact that Stencel was decided thirteen years
after the issuance of the Agent Orange contracts and dealt with
noncontractual indemnification under state tort law, rather than
contractual indemnification under federal contract law.76
While the dissent agreed with the majority's position that con-
tractual indemnification should never be readily granted, it dis-
agreed with the majority's absolute prohibition of
indemnification,77 finding that the majority did not consider the
contracting parties' expectations of fair allocation of risks and
good faith dealing.78 In addition, Justice Breyer believed the
majority distorted past circumstances by viewing them through
present law, rather than the laws in effect in the 1960s. 79 Justice
Breyer recommended that the case be remanded to the trial court
for additional fact finding, commenting that the Court of Federal
Claims had greater familiarity with the factual matters of the
case and could further investigate matters outside the scope of
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
8 0
In Hercules, Inc. v. United States,81 the Supreme Court
examined both tort and contract theory in its analysis of the
issues in the case. 2 Since the compulsory DPA contracts the
contractors performed for the government provided the underly-
ing source for the veterans' tort suits, the Court addressed the
issue of whether the veterans could assert a tort claim directly
against the government for injuries allegedly caused by Agent
Orange, finding the "Feres doctrine" controlling on this issue.8 3
In Feres v. United States,84 the military member plaintiffs
alleged that negligence by other military personnel caused their
74. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
75. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 993-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).




80. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 994 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996).
82. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 989. The Court has previously held that "liability
may be styled in tort, but it arises out of performance of the [government] contract-and
traditionally has been regarded as sufficiently related to the contract [to directly affect
government interests]." Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505.
83. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 989.
84. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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injuries.8 5 To support their claims, the plaintiffs relied on the
language in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 86 stating that
liability for the negligent conduct of government employees act-
ing within the scope of their employment would attach to the
government unless the government could claim immunity under
some act of Congress or the judiciary.87 Therefore, the Feres
Court held that Congress clearly intended the government to be
immunized, as sovereign, from liability for injuries or death to
military personnel on active duty arising from the negligent acts
or omissions of other military personnel." The Court reasoned
that Congress had provided mechanisms for recovery of damages
85. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136. The three plaintiffs' cases were consolidated to resolve
a conflict on the issue of sovereign immunity between the circuit courts. Id. Plaintiff
Feres was the executrix of the estate of an active duty military member who claimed the
government was responsible for the negligent conduct of other military personnel when
plaintiffs decedent was killed in an Army barracks fire, alleging that Army personnel
knew or should have known the building's heating plant was defective and therefore
unsafe. Id. Plaintiff Jefferson was an active duty military member who claimed the gov-
ernment was responsible for the negligent conduct of an Army surgeon who allegedly left
a towel measuring eighteen inches wide by thirty inches long, marked "Medical Depart-
ment U.S. Army," inside the plaintiffs stomach during surgery. id. at 137. Plaintiff
Griggs was the executrix of the estate of an active duty military member who claimed the
government was responsible for her decedent's death at the hands of allegedly negligent
Army surgeons. Id.
86. Id. at 138. The Federal Tort Claims Act was originally enacted as Chap. 753,
Title IV, 60 Stat. 843 (1946). FTCA was repealed as a separate statute and its provisions
recodified in 28 U.S.C. Sections 1291, 1346 (b)(1), 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411,
2412, and 2671-2680 (1982, as amended). The consent of the Government to be sued
under the FTCA is embodied in 28 U.S.C. Section 1346 (b)(1) (1994):
§ 1346. United States as defendant
(b) (1) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title [28 U.S.C. § 2671 et
seq.], the district courts .... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages.... for injury or loss of prop-
erty, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1) (1994).
87. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140. The FTCA provides, in part:
§ 2674. Liability of the United States
The United States shall be liable.., relating to tort claims, in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances ....
With respect to any claim under this chapter [28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.], the United
States shall be entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative
immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the
United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other
defenses to which the United States is entitled.
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994). The Feres Court found, however, that the relationship between
the government and military members was unique in character and had no parallel to
relationships between private individuals, thereby excepting military personnel from cov-
erage under the FTCA. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42.
88. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. The FTCA provides, in part:
§ 2680. Exceptions
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by military members under various statutes, 9 similar to state
workmen's compensation arrangements, and therefore, injured
military members and their estates had no additional rights
under the FTCA to sue the government for injuries or death inci-
dent to military service.90 Relying on this reasoning, the Court in
Hercules III held that the veterans and their families were com-
pensated for their injuries through the operation of statutory
provisions, and thus were precluded from asserting claims for
negligence against the government in the class action and opt-
out suits.9 1
In Hercules III, the Court also considered the question of
whether the government could similarly assert the defense of
sovereign immunity to deny indemnification and contribution to
a government contractor when the government supplied the
specifications for a product that allegedly caused injury to an
active duty service member. 92 The Court distinguished its 1918
holding in United States v. Spearin,9 stating that the warranty
of specifications in Spearin extended only to possibility of per-
formance and could not be expanded to cover unforeseen third-
party tort claims.94 The majority found that the "Stencel doc-
The provisions of this chapter [28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq.]. .. shall not apply to-
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces,
or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1994).
89. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45 nn.12-13. See, e.g., Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of
1940 § 1 et seq., 50 U.S.C. app. § 501 et seq. (1994); Veterans' Benefit Act ("VBA"), 38
U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1994).
90. Feres, 340 U.S. at 145.
91. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 989.
92. Id. at 986.
93. 248 U.S. 132 (1918). In Spearin, a government contractor sued for payment for
work performed under a construction contract in accordance with government furnished
plans and specifications. Spearin, 248 U.S. at 133. Due to conditions known to the gov-
ernment but not the contractor, and conditions known to neither party, unexpected
weather destroyed the work already performed and made the site unsafe. Id. at 134.
The contractor refused to proceed with reconstruction unless the government
agreed to the following conditions: (1) pay him for work already completed; (2) make the
site safe; and (3) assume liability for future damage caused by the defective plans and
specifications. Id. at 135. Instead, the government repudiated the contract. Id.
The Court found that while differing site conditions or unforeseen events did not
entitle a contractor to additional compensation in excess of the agreed contract price, the
government, as author of the plans and specifications, incurred liability for damages to
the contractor due to the defective specifications. Id. at 136-37. The Court reasoned that
a warranty of specifications was created by the government's provision of the specifica-
tions to the contractor, assuring the contractor that if he complied with the specifications,
the finished product would be sufficient for its intended purpose. Id.
94. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 986. The Spearin Court found that if the govern-
ment had envisioned the advent of such third-party claims, it probably would have
expressly stated in the contracts that it would not accept responsibility. Id.
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trine" controlled this issue, even though it was decided thirteen
years after the formation of the first DPA contracts for Agent
Orange. 95
In Stencel, a manufacturer of an aircraft ejection system
claimed indemnification and contribution from the government,
as joint tortfeasor and supplier of the specifications, for damages
that might prospectively accrue to the manufacturer from loss of
a suit brought by a National Guard fighter pilot who was perma-
nently disabled when the ejection system failed in flight.96 The
Supreme Court found that since the Feres doctrine prevented the
injured pilot from recovering damages from the government in
excess of statutory compensation provisions, Stencel Aero should
likewise be prohibited from recovering damages under the same
rationale since the relationship of the government to its suppli-
ers is analogous to the relationship between the government and
its military members.97 In addition, the Court held that under
the reasoning of United States v. Brown,98 permitting subordi-
nates to sue their superiors in the military for negligent acts and
omissions would cause an unacceptable breakdown in military
discipline. 99 The Court distinguished its previous holding in
United States v. Yellow Cab, °° in which the claimants were civil-
95. Id.; Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). The Hercu-
les III Court stated that although it realized Stencel was decided after the contracts were
formed, the same rationale had been applied by the Ninth Circuit in United Air Lines v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379,404 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), and therefore,
should have "at the very least suggested that the government would not be liable under
tort theory." Hercules, 116 S. Ct. at 987. In Weiner, the Ninth Circuit held that the
government is not liable for indemnification and contribution to its joint tortfeasor, a
civilian airline company, for damages paid to the estates of government employees killed
in a mid-air collision between a commercial airliner and a military fighter aircraft when
the government employees are covered by the provisions of the Federal Employees Com-
pensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 757 (b) (1994). Weiner, 335 F.2d at 455.
96. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 667. Stencel Aero provided the ejection system under sub-
contract to North American Rockwell, which contracted with the government to supply F-
100 fighter aircraft. Id. at 667-68 n.2. Thus, no contractual relationship existed between
Stencel and the government. Id.
97. Id. at 671-72.
98. 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (holding that payment of compensation by the government
to a military member under the VBA does not preclude the member from also recovering
from the Government under FTCA for negligent aggravation of a pre-existing injury by
military physicians).
99. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112. The Court feared that all military orders might be
subjected to hindsight, opening a Pandora's box of potential individual and governmental
liability in any case involving the injury or death of a service member. Id.
100. 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (holding that the government could be impleaded as a third
party defendant and be liable for indemnity and contribution for damages paid by trans-
portation companies to civilian passengers injured when the vehicle, in which they were
riding, was struck by a vehicle negligently driven by a government employee acting
within the scope of employment).
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ians and not subject to the military exclusion provision of the
FTCA or the Feres doctrine. 10 1
Following -the reasoning of Stencel, the Hercules III Court
ruled that the provision of specifications for Agent Orange by the
government implied only the creation of a narrow warranty of
specifications: if the contractor followed the specifications, satis-
factory performance of the contract was possible. 10 2 Therefore,
the Court concluded that permitting indemnification under con-
tract theory on the grounds of an implied warranty of specifica-
tions defeated the purpose of the FTCA, which denied the same
indemnification to the contractor under tort theory. 10 3 In either
case, the Agent Orange veterans would essentially be receiving
compensation indirectly from the government.
0 4
On the issue of whether the government contractor defense
provided immunity to the contractors, and thus, made settlement
of the class action suit by the contractors unnecessary, the Her-
cules III Court found the rule established in Boyle v. United
States'015 applicable. 1 6 In Boyle, a Marine pilot drowned when
the escape hatch in his helicopter jammed after a crash at sea.0 7
The decedent's representative claimed that the hatch was either
defectively repaired by military maintenance personnel or defec-
tively designed by the manufacturer.
0 8
The Boyle Court found the need for uniformity in the disposi-
tion of civil claims by third parties against government contrac-
101. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 670.
102. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 986.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
106. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 985. Prior to Boyle, the circuit courts had
approached the government contractor issue in differing ways. Id. at 991 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The Third and Ninth Circuits held that the government contractor defense
was viable due to the "Feres doctrine." See Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d
246, 249-54 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that government contractor defense provides immu-
nity to the manufacturer of a bulldozer which injures a military reservist when the gov-
ernment furnishes the specifications for the bulldozer); McKay v. Rockwell Intl Corp.,
704 F.2d 444, 448-451 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a supplier of military aircraft is not
strictly liable to service members or their heirs when the government either provides
specifications to the contractor or approves the contractor's detailed final specifications).
The Fifth Circuit did not recognize the government contractor defense. See Hansen v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that, under Texas
law, an asbestos manufacturer was liable for compensatory and punitive damages to a
decedent's estate even though the government had established product specifications and
government's knowledge of the hazards of asbestos was equal to the manufacturer's).
107. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502. During the accident investigation, a small piece of loose
wire unlike that used anywhere in the helicopter was found in the motor that operated
the escape hatch. Id. at 503.
108. Id. The hatch opened outward, making it impossible to open due to water pres-
sure when the helicopter was submerged. Id.
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tors an area of "uniquely federal interest," justifying the
preemption of state law by "federal common law."109 The Court
held this unique federal interest is best served by extending the
immunity enjoyed by the government, as sovereign, to its con-
tractors under the "government contractor defense," since those
contractors are performing functions at the behest of, and under
the authority of, the government.110
Rejecting Feres and the FTCA as the bases for finding that the
interests of the Government could best be served by extending
government immunity to contractors doing the government's
work,"' the Boyle Court reasoned that if government contractors
were found liable to third parties, the interests of the govern-
ment would not be served.1 2 The threat of liability would proba-
bly significantly increase the costs of procurement in order to
cover contractors' potential liabilities to third parties; or, if they
were unable to increase prices, contractors would refuse to per-
form to specifications developed by the government.
113
Instead, the Boyle Court reasoned that although the FTCA
authorized the payment of damages by the United States to per-
sons harmed by the wrongful or negligent acts or omissions of
government employees and agencies," 4 the FTCA does not apply
to claims resulting from the performance of discretionary func-
tions or duties by government employees or agencies."15 The
Court found the design or approval of military specifications by
the government to be such a discretionary function."16 Therefore,
109. Id. at 504. Federal common law is fashioned by the courts in the absence of
statutory authority, displacing state law in instances where procurement contracts affect
the rights and duties of the United States. Id.
110. Id. at 506.
111. Id. at 510. The Court found the holding in Feres too narrow, as it only
addresses claims by military personnel and does not encompass civilian claims. Id.
112. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
113. Id. Either result would adversely affect government interests in keeping prices
reasonable and maintaining sufficient sources of supply to meet government needs. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis supplied); see supra note 85 for the relevant text of Section 1346
of the FTCA, entitled "United States as defendant."
115. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. The FTCA provides, in part:
§ 2680. Exceptions
The provisions of this chapter [28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.] and section 1346 (b) of this
title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a fed-
eral agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1996).
116. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. Essentially, the contractor stands in the place of the
government. Id.
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a suit by a person claiming injury due to defective military speci-
fications is not consented to by the government because of the
military exception to the consent provisions of the FTCA.
117
The Court in Boyle formulated a new three-part test for deter-
mining when federal common law will be applied over state law
in cases where claims of injury are based on defective specifica-
tions."' The elements of the test are: (1) the government
approved reasonably detailed specifications; (2) the equipment
or product conforms to those specifications; and (3) the contractor
warned the government about the dangers in the use of the
equipment or product that are known to the supplier, but not the
government."19
By applying the Boyle test, the Court in Hercules III specu-
lated that the contractors could have successfully asserted the
government contractor defense. 2° The Court found, however,
that by failing to assert this affirmative defense, the contractors
had voluntarily assumed liability for the veterans' injuries that
could otherwise have been avoided. 2' Thus, the government was
117. Id. The Court found state laws that create liability for design defects in gov-
ernment contracts to be in conflict with federal policy (the state erroneously assumed the
existence of a distinction between the government and a contractor performing the gov-
ernment's bidding). Id. at 512. In such cases, the Court stated that federal common law
displaces state law in order to achieve national uniformity regarding suits against gov-
ernment contractors, regardless of the place where the alleged act or omission occurs. Id.
118. Id. at 512.
119. Id. at 512-13. The third element (the superior knowledge of the contractor
must be divulged to the government) is imposed to prevent the contractor from sup-
pressing important, but adverse, information about the equipment or product that might
cause production interruptions to interfere with discretionary decisions of the govern-
ment under the provisions of the FTCA. Id.
120. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 985. The Court in Boyle addressed the issue of dis-
placement of state tort law by federal common law. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
The district court initially claimed jurisdiction in the class action suit under fed-
eral common law because of the presence of "significant federal interests" (federal ques-
tion jurisdiction). In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig, 506 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980). On appeal, a divided Second Circuit reversed
the district court's choice of federal common law, finding that although the government
has an "obvious interest" in supporting both its veterans and manufacturers, a federal
policy striking the proper balance between the competing parties was "as yet undeter-
mined." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1980). The
circuit court concluded that prior to the formation of federal common law rules, the use of
state law must pose a threat to an "identifiable" federal policy. Id.
The veterans amended their complaint to assert diversity of citizenship as the
basis for federal jurisdiction. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690,
692 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). In order to cope with the special circumstances of the case, in which
over forty state jurisdictions were then represented, Judge Weinstein created the legal
fiction of "national consensus law," assuming that all state transferor courts would proba-
bly treat the substantive issues in the same way. Id. at 693.
121. Hercules IIl, 116 S. Ct. at 985. The Court tacitly adopted the reasoning of the
Federal Circuit in Hercules II, which stated that since the settlement by the contractors
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not liable to the contractors for damages that the Court found
resulted from acts outside the government's control. 122
The five courts involved in the Agent Orange litigation12 were
obviously uncomfortable with the suits. Judge Plager, in his dis-
senting opinion in Hercules II, clearly enunciated this uneasi-
ness: "[it may be that it is best to put this chapter of our nation's
history [the Vietnam War] behind us, and to bury the issues with
the dead. Appellants, by bringing this suit, do not allow us that
peace.... 124
The tortuous and prolonged course of the Agent Orange litiga-
tion over nearly two decades might have been curtailed at any
phase by judicial acknowledgment that the controversy was non-
justiciable. A broad political question lies at the heart of the
Agent Orange litigation - whether the hope of an early end to a
unpopular war justified decisions by the military department of
the executive branch concerning the conduct of the war in South-
east Asia.
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers dictates
that the role of the judicial branch is to interpret the laws of theUnited States, not review the political decisions made by another
branch of the government. 125 The military's decision to order the
production of Agent Orange under DPA contracts was such a
political decision, as was the decision to issue specifications for
those contracts mandating that the drums bear no instructions
was a voluntary act, settlement severed any causative link between the DPA contracts
and the contractors' alleged injury. Id.; see also Hercules 11, 24 F.3d at 200.
122. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 985.
123. Five courts have issued ninety-two opinions or rulings on some aspect of the
Agent Orange litigation:
(1) The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York: fifty-
eight opinions on various procedural and substantive issues in the class action, opt-
out and corporate tort claims issued between 1979 and 1992.
(2) The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: eighteen appellate
opinions on various procedural and substantive issues in the class action, opt-out
and corporate tort claims issued between 1980 and 1993.
(3) The United States Court of Federal Claims: two opinions on corporate contract
claims issued between 1991 and 1992.
(4) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: one appellate opin-
ion on corporate contract claims issued in 1994.
(5) The Supreme Court of the United States: one appellate opinion on corporate
contract claims issued in 1996; one writ of certiorari granted in 1995; eleven writs
of certiorari denied on various procedural and substantive issues in the class
action, opt-out and corporate tort claims between 1981 and 1994.
124. Hercules 11, 24 F.3d at 205 (Plager, J., dissenting).
125. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to such a jurisdic-
tion .... The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the consti-
tution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
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for use or manufacturer's name. The manner of Agent Orange's
use by the government was, similarly, a political decision. The
Hercules III Court did not discuss the effect of the underlying
political question, or acknowledge that such a question existed.
Instead, the Court assumed jurisdiction of this case under the
Tucker Act.126 By asserting Tucker Act jurisdiction, the contrac-
tors fought their battle under the wrong flag. The Tucker Act
explicitly states that its jurisdiction extends to express or
implied contracts between private parties and the United States
and to liquidated or unliquidated damages in actions not sound-
ing in tort.'27 The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted
the phrase "implied contracts" in the Tucker Act to mean con-
tracts implied-in-fact: unspoken agreements reasonably infera-
ble from the conduct of the parties. 2 8 The Hercules III Court
held that at the time the contracts were issued, no reasonable
inference could be drawn from the conduct of either the govern-
ment or the contractors that future indemnification was contem-
plated as an unspoken provision in the DPA contracts for Agent
Orange. 12 There is nothing in the record to suggest that either
of the contractors requested an indemnification provision to be
added to the contracts.
The government tested Agent Orange in the laboratory for
more than ten years prior to the issuance of the contracts. 130 The
military successfully field tested defoliants in Vietnam during
the Kennedy Administration. 3' Based on the scientific evidence
available to the government in the mid-1960's, defoliants seemed
a safe and relatively inexpensive way to shorten a politically and
emotionally divisive war.132 The contractors had produced herbi-
cides containing the two Agent Orange components 2,4-D and
2,4,5-T for the commercial agricultural market.133 There was no
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1994).
127. Id.
128. Hercules III, 116 S. Ct. at 985 (citing Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575
(1921) (holding that the right to sue the United States under the Tucker Act is based on
the existence of an enforceable contract, either express or implied-in-fact); Merritt v.
United States, 267 U.S. 338 (1925) (holding that the Tucker Act does not apply to claims
that can only be styled "a contract implied-in-law"); United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv.
Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1926) (holding that judgment under the Tucker Act must be predicated
on a contract implied-in-fact); and United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (holding
that although the language of the Tucker Act contains the term "implied contacts," the
jurisdiction of the Act does not reach contracts implied-in-law, only contracts implied-in-
fact)).
129. Id. at 987.
130. ScHcicK, supra note 1, at 16.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Hercules 11, 24 F.3d at 191.
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reason for the contractors or the government to believe at the
time of contract formation that Agent Orange production created
risks that would make the extraordinary inclusion of an indem-
nification clause necessary.
134
The Court in Hercules III did not mention another salient fact
about Tucker Act jurisdiction: the Act specifically states that it
is inapplicable to actions for liquidated damages sounding in
tort.135 The fact that the contractors initially brought an action
for indemnification and contribution from the government under
tort theory lends credence to the hypothesis that this suit was
really an action sounding in tort masquerading as a breach of
contract action. From a practical litigation standpoint, the con-
tractors' would have put forth their strongest argument first -
the argument based on tort theory. Identical facts gave rise to
both the tort and contract lines of cases. The damages requested
were the same. The parties' briefs and the Court's majority and
dissenting opinions freely interjected tort terminology and case
law into an ostensible discussion of contract issues. As Gertrude
Stein once wrote, "A rose is a rose is a rose."136 Hercules III can
be viewed simply as a second attempt by the contractors to
obtain indemnification and contribution from the government as
an alleged joint tortfeasor. Under this reasoning, the Court
lacked jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to hear the contractors'
appeal.
Further, the Court stated that the Tucker Act's jurisdiction
does not extend to contracts implied-in-law, and, therefore, did
not explore how the equitable theory of promissory estoppel
might have produced a different result.137 The contractors would
probably also have failed on equitable grounds because of the dif-
ficulty in proving the existence of the second element of promis-
sory estoppel: that a "promise" by the government produced a
reasonable expectation of reliance by the contractors. Even if the
134. Id. at 204.
135. See supra note 25 for the relevant text of the Tucker Act.
136. THE POCKET BOOK OF QuOTATIONs 323 (Henry Davidoff ed.) (1952).
137. Promissory estoppel is an extraordinary equitable remedy used by courts to
prevent "manifest" injustice and unjust enrichment from occurring when one of the par-
ties to a promise has substantially and detrimentally changed his position in reasonable
reliance on the other party's performance of the promise. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CoNTP .cTs 274-76 (3d ed. 1990). The elements of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel are:
§ 90 Promises Reasonably Inducing Definite Action or Forbearance
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding only if injustice can be avoided by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1) (1981).
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Court accepted the contractors' premise that Section 2157 of the
DPA implied a government promise to hold the contractors
harmless for consequential damages arising directly or indirectly
from the contract, the Court would probably hold that reliance by
the contractors was unreasonable. The government explicitly
refused to participate in the settlement negotiations on the
grounds of sovereign immunity.138 This refusal leads to the ines-
capable conclusion that the government never intended the con-
tractors to rely on an implied promise to hold harmless or
indemnify.
The Hercules III opinion is vulnerable to criticism on the issue
of the government contractor defense principally because the
Court held the contractors to rules only announced definitively
long after the contracts' formation, and four years after the dis-
trict court urged the settlement.139 The majority stated that the
contractors should have realized the future viability of the gov-
ernment contractor defense based on existing circuit court deci-
sions. This thesis that the contractors should have known what
the state of the law would be four years later is both unrealistic
and unjust. The Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts
that the state of the law at the time an action arises provides the
only rational basis for decision. 4° The circuit courts at the time
of settlement were sharply divided on the issue of whether a gov-
ernment contractor defense existed.
1 4 '
The two district court judges overseeing the class action suit
resolved the government contractor issue in opposite ways.
Judge Pratt granted summary judgment to the contractors, but
through an accident of bad timing for the contractors, his order
was never formally entered before he left the court.'42 Judge
Weinstein ruled that the issue of government contractor immu-
138. "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. at 879.
139. The Court's decision in Boyle was announced in 1988, recognizing authorita-
tively for the first time the doctrine of government contractor immunity. Boyle, 487 U.S.
at 500.
140. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986) (holding that the state of
the law when Congress enacts legislation provides courts with the appropriate guidance
for limiting rescission remedies in securities contracts); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16
(1984) (holding that when a defendant fails to challenge a jury instruction based on a
novel constitutional issue in accordance with state court procedures, he or she is not
barred from raising the issue for the first time in a later federal habeas corpus proceed-
ing); Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982) (holding that Congress demon-
strates intent to preserve a judicially created remedy in a private cause of action not
specifically addressed in a statute when it takes no action to fill the gap in the statute).
141. See supra note 105 for examples of the diverse conclusions reached by the cir-
cuit courts on the issue of the "government contractor" defense.
142. Hercules I1, 116 S. Ct. at 984.
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nity was one not for the court to determine, but for the jury.143
The contractors were rightly concerned that a jury might be so
swayed by the emotional testimony of the veterans that a fair
trial on the merits might be impossible. In addition, pretrial set-
tlement has always been favored by courts in the interest of judi-
cial economy244 By settling, the contractors mitigated their
damages, which might have proved ruinous for even the largest
producers, such as Dow and Monsanto, had the case proceeded to
trial. 145 Finally, the government, the only common link between
the veterans and the contractors, actively opposed the govern-
ment contractor defense. One might say that the government
had its cake and ate it too. After effectively removing itself from
the case by asserting sovereign immunity, the government con-
tinued to meddle in the case from the safe fortress created by
that immunity.
The Hercules III Court's application of future law to the issue
of the government contractor defense is legally indefensible, cre-
ating the overwhelming impression that the Court first decided
the outcome of the issue, and perhaps the case, and only then
searched for arg-uments to support the preordained result that
the government would prevail, whether or not those arguments
logically fit the facts. 14 By demanding clairvoyance from the
contractors, the Court's decision as a whole loses credibility,
143. Judge Weinstein noted that "lack of certainty because of scarcity of legal prece-
dent [on the issue of the government contractor defense] argues in favor of approving the
settlement." "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. at 843.
144. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in part:
Rule 1. Scope and Purpose
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of
a civil nature .... They shall be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
Rule 16. Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties... to appear before it for a conference or confer-
ences before trial for such purposes as ...
(5) facilitating settlement of the case.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
145. The veterans in the class action suit claimed damages "in the range of four to
forty billion dollars." "Agent Orange," 635 F.2d at 989 n.5.
146. Justice Benjamin Cardozo admonished judges to avoid exceeding their author-
ity in pursuit of a particular result:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at his
own pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal
of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.
He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence.
He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disci-
plined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the
social life.' Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.
BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, Th NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
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leading to the conclusion that no matter what flag the contrac-
tors fought under, the outcome of the battle was known before
the combatants took the field.
On the other hand, the Court may have reasoned that the
risks attending a finding for the contractors were too great.
Although this reasoning is unexpressed in Hercules III, there is a
strong undercurrent suggesting that the Court believed the gov-
ernment must prevail in this case. If the contractors had suc-
ceeded in their claim for reimbursement of the settlement costs
under either tort or contract theory, the doctrines of sovereign
and government contractor immunity might both be called into
serious question, creating financial vulnerability for the govern-
ment. A finding for the contractors could have resulted in the
overturning of Boyle, 47 Stencel,148 and perhaps even Feres.'49
The Court drew a parallel in the relationships between the
government and those who serve its interests in Feres and
Stencel. Future litigants claiming injury from government acts
or omissions could probably demonstrate a reverse parallel -
that government liability to a government contractor under
Stencel creates at least a tacit admission of government liability
to the injured military member under Feres because of the analo-
gous relationships. If Feres was overruled, the military exclusion
under the Federal Tort Claims Act' 50 might also be challenged in
the future by military members suffering from the mysterious
Persian Gulf War Syndrome.' 5 ' One current theory of causation
for the syndrome is the government's prophylactic administra-
147. Boyle v. United Technologies, 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (holding government con-
tractors immune from liability to injured or deceased service members).
148. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (holding the
government not liable under the FTCA for indemnifying a subcontractor not in privity for
damages paid to an injured military member).
149. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. at 135 (1950) (holding the government not
liable to military members for injuries incident to military service). Although the Feres
doctrine has been criticized by both the Supreme Court (see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510) and
many legal scholars (see, e.g., David E. Seidelson, From Feres v. United States to Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.: an Examination of Supreme Court Jurisprudence and a
Couple of Suggestions, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 219 (1994)), Congress has not amended the FTCA
to legislatively overrule Feres. The Feres Court itself was unsure of whether it had inter-
preted the FTCA correctly, due to the absence of legislative history, but stated, "if we
misinterpret the [Tort Claims] Act, at least Congress possesses a ready remedy." Feres,
340 U.S. at 138. Congress' inaction for the past forty-seven years signifies tacit approval
of the Feres Court's interpretation of the FTCA.
150. See supra note 87 for the relevant text of Section 2680 to the FTCA
("Exceptions").
151. The reported symptoms of Persian Gulf Syndrome include short term memory
loss, headaches, fatigue, gastrointestinal problems, skin eruptions, swelling and birth
defects. Philip Shenon, Sickened by Iraqi Gas Arms?, PrrrsBaUGH POST-GAzETrE, Sept.
22, 1996, at A-14.
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tion of vaccinations and medications to military members to com-
bat the effects of possible Iraqi nerve gas and biological
weapons. 152 If this theory proves valid, the courts may be con-
fronted with another mass toxic tort suit.
The government's victory in Hercules III may prove a Pyr-
rhic153 one. This case concerned contracts performed under a
mandatory statute, but the effect of the Court's decision will
reach far beyond the narrow realm of the DPA and the Anti-Defi-
ciency Act to the voluntary purchasing transactions that com-
prise the bulk of government procurement. The dire predictions
of the Boyle Court" may come to pass - contractors will be
unwilling to rely on the uncertain protection afforded by the gov-
ernment contractor defense because of the Court's ruling in Her-
cules III.
Many commercial suppliers already avoid doing business with
the government because of the bureaucratic maze of paperwork
and regulations, not to mention the frequent delays in payment.
It is a near certainty that future contractors will demand higher
prices for government orders, attempting to cover both foresee-
able and unforeseeable contingencies. These increased costs will
prove vastly more expensive than the approximately thirty mil-
lion dollars the contractors sought in damages in this case. The
decision in favor of the government may also result in a diminu-
tion of the current government supplier base, as this decision
sent a clear warning to potential government contractors that
the government will not accept financial liability if it can find
some other party to bear that burden.1
55
Ironically, if the contracting parties had both been private
entities, unshielded by statutory immunity, the contractors could
have recovered their damages easily with the blessing of the
152. William Brook Lafferty, The Persian Gulf War Syndrome: Rethinking Govern-
ment Tort Liability, 25 STETSON L. REV. 137, 144-45 (1995). Prior to deployment to the
Gulf, military members received three vaccinations of anti-toxins and enzyme tablets and
each was issued a field kit containing syringes of anti-spasmodic drugs to be self-adminis-
tered in case of Iraqi nerve gas exposure. Id. A Senate committee report postulated that
the previously untested combination of these preventive measures may have resulted in
the symptoms experienced by Persian Gulf Syndrome sufferers. Id. (citing Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related
Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the
Persian Gulf War, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (May 25, 1994)).
153. A "Pyrrhic" victory is one whose gains are more than offset by the magnitude of
the victor's losses. MERRLM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 953 (10th ed. 1994).
154. The Court predicted that contractors would either decline to produce items to
government-furnished specifications or raise prices. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
155. Thompson ceased operations entirely, largely as a result of this litigation. Peti-
tioners' Brief, Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d 188 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (No. 94-818)
(citing 27-28 app.).
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Court. It is a further irony that the appellant contractors were
probably the least culpable of the Agent Orange producers.
156
Agent Orange supplied by Hercules contained no measurable
dioxin after 1965.157 Thompson, one of the smallest of the produ-
cers, repeatedly begged the government for release from its two
contracts; nonetheless, Thompson's Agent Orange contained
extremely low levels of dioxin. 15 Both the district court and the
Second Circuit found the contractors' knowledge of the potential
risks of Agent Orange vastly inferior to the government's when
the government was forced to disclose scientific and military doc-
uments during discovery.
1 59
Justice Breyer suggested in his dissent that the Court had
insufficient facts on which to base its decision. If the facts were
not sufficiently discovered in the nineteen years of litigation'
60
that preceded Hercules III, it is unlikely that further proceed-
ings will reveal some previously elusive material facts. Remand-
ing this case would be both a waste of judicial time and
attorneys' fees for both the contractors and the government. Suf-
ficient facts were developed in the district, claims and circuit
courts to adjudicate this case. It is highly unlikely that further
discovery would influence the Supreme Court sufficiently to pro-
duce a different result, given the Hercules III majority's discount-
ing or disregard of facts, statutory provisions and precedent
tending to support the contractor's claims.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the Hercules III majority
opinion, in several of his past dissents 6 ' quoted Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes' famous observation that "great cases, like hard
cases, make bad law."162 Hercules III is exactly the kind of case
Justice Holmes had in mind. The case was "great" both in its
156. See supra note 18 for trial court's allocation of damages among the seven man-
ufacturers of Agent Orange in the settlement of the class action suit.
157. 'Agent Orange," 565 F. Supp. at 1274.
158. Id. at 1273.
159. Id. at 1274.
160. The first Agent Orange suit was filed in July 1978. Hercules 11, 24 F.3d at 206
n.3 (Plager, J., dissenting).
161. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(holding that a state statute delegating the state's power to veto liquor licenses to
churches and school located in proximity to the proposed licensee's establishment violates
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution);
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 98 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is vio-
lated when a trial court excludes evidence tending to exculpate a defendant, thereby
denying the defendant a fair trial); Davis v. U.S., 417 U.S. 333, 367 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (holding that a defendant's conviction should be set aside when after convic-
tion, but before appeal, there is an intervening change in the law rendering the act no
longer a crime).
162. Justice Holmes commented:
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scope and complexity. Like the Agent Orange cases which pre-
ceded the Hercules cases, the Hercules cases arose out of one of
the most controversial chapters in this nation's history, affected
a huge number of individuals and explored the relationship
between the two capacities in which the government may act -
its sovereign capacity and its contractual capacity. 163 This case
was "hard" because of the intricacy, novelty and variety of the
interrelated legal theories presented for adjudication, the dura-
tion of the litigation and the number of courts and litigants
involved. The result is that Hercules III is "bad law" since the
underlying historical facts create serious doubt as to whether the
government acted with the good faith expected from a party to a
contract in either its dealings with the veterans or with the
Agent Orange contractors who performed the government's
bidding.
The result reached by the Court in Hercules III will be debated
for many years. There were no true victors in this litigation, only
victims. The contractors were damaged financially by their expo-
sure to Agent Orange, but the damage to the credibility of the
government and the Court may be far greater. The tragedy of
the Agent Orange litigation, like the tragedy of the Vietnam war,
is not yet complete; it will continue to haunt American society
and its institutions long after the last of the Agent Orange veter-
ans and their children are dead.
Leslie A. Sherman
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by
reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of
some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic
pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which
even well settled principles of law will bend.
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
concurring).
163. In its sovereign capacity, the government is immune to suit unless it expressly
waives that right. BLAC's LAw DicTIONARY, 1396 (6th ed. 1991). In its contractual
capacity, the government waives its sovereign immunity, becoming an ordinary market
participant with the same rights and obligations as any other party to a contract. Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1996); see supra note 25.
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